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Abstract
Flushing the cache, using instructions like clflush and
wbinvd, is commonly proposed as a countermeasure against
access-based cache attacks. In this report, we show that sev-
eral Intel caches, specifically the L1 caches in some pre-
Skylake processors and the L2 caches in some post-Broadwell
processors, leak information even after being flushed through
clflush and wbinvd instructions. That is, security-critical
assumptions about the behavior of clflush and wbinvd in-
structions are incorrect, and countermeasures that rely on
them should be revised.
1 Introduction
Caches are small, fast memories that bridge the latency gap
between the CPU and the main memory. Caches are critical
for performance: they speed up computation by storing re-
cently accessed data and reducing the interaction with main
memory [53].
Caches are also critical from a security perspective since
they are often shared (both temporally and spatially) across se-
curity domains. This has inspired a multitude of covert [35,54]
and side-channel attacks [5, 19, 38, 43, 55] in many differ-
ent settings: web pages [15, 37, 50], OS processes [20, 21],
mobile phones [18, 31], virtual machines [26, 34, 35], and
trusted environments [6, 17, 36, 41, 57]. Caches also have a
prominent role in recent transient-execution [30, 32, 44] and
data-sampling [9, 40, 46] attacks, which use caches as high-
bandwidth exfiltration channels.
Classic cache-based attacks, such as Prime+Probe [38]
and Flush+Reload [55], leak information through the con-
tent of the cache, i.e., which memory blocks are accessed
and stored in the cache. Researchers, however, also explored
leaks through the so-called cache’s control state [49], i.e.,
the cache’s replacement policy metadata. Doychev et al. [12]
show that the lookup table preloading countermeasure used
in some AES implementations may leak information through
the control state of a cache with a PLRU replacement policy.
More recently, new attacks based on the cache’s control state
have been devised for high-bandwidth covert channels [54],
bypassing Intel CAT’s [24] isolation [29], and performing
practical side-channel attacks in modern L3 caches [8].
To protect a victim program against access-based cache
attackers (i.e., attackers that can interact with the shared cache
before and after the victim’s execution), it suffices preventing
that the effects of the victim’s execution on the cache cross the
security domain boundary. Given the belief that cache flushing
(using the clflush and wbinvd instructions) cleanses the
cache from any history-dependent information, cache flushing
on context switches has been thought to provide—at least
on single-threaded cores—resistance against access-based
attacks. As an example, several works [2–4,7,11,16,39,48,51,
58] propose using cache flushing (sometimes in combination
with other countermeasures and optimizations) to prevent
cache covert and side-channel attacks.
Cache flushing has also been used as part of mitiga-
tions against recent microarchitectural vulnerabilities like
L1TF [44] or CacheOut [47]. For instance, Intel suggests
that cache flushing (using clflush and wbinvd instructions)
and finer-grained flushing instructions like IA32_FLUSH_CMD
(supported by new microcode updates when the L1D_FLUSH
processor flag is set) could be used to remove secrets from
the L1D cache [22]. Furthermore, processors for which
the L1D_FLUSH flag is enabled and which are affected by
L1TF will automatically flush the L1D cache when execut-
ing the RSM instruction that exits System Management Mode
(SMM). Similar mechanisms have been recommended for
protecting virtual machines and SGX enclaves on context
switches [22, 44].
Previous work by Ge et al. [13, 14] investigates the effec-
tiveness of flushing operations and shows that information
persists in some microarchitectural components (specifically
in the instruction cache, branch target buffer, branch history
table, and translation lookahead buffer) even after flushing.
They also observe some residual leakage after flushing
the data cache, and they associate it to the effects of data
prefetchers.
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In work concurrent to ours, Wistoff et al. [51] show that,
on the Ariane RISC-V core [56], software solutions based on
priming1 are insufficient to mitigate cache covert channels.
This is explained by the pseudo-random cache replacement
policy implemented in Ariane.
We complement these results and demonstrate that cache
flushing does not cleanse the cache from history-dependent
information in several Intel processors. Even though cache
flushing effectively eliminates leaks through the content of the
cache (i.e., which memory blocks are stored in it), it does not
prevent leaks through metadata, specifically through the state
of the cache replacement policy (i.e., how memory blocks are
accessed).
Our results imply that flushing instructions are insufficient
to completely defeat access-based cache attacks in some Intel
CPUs.
2 Cache Control States Survive Flushing
Prior work [1, 49] independently reports on nondeterministic
behaviors, on several Intel processors, after flushing caches
with wbinvd and clflush instructions. Specifically, nonde-
terministic behavior after flushing has been observed in the
L1 caches of Sandy Bridge, Ivy Bridge, Haswell, and Broad-
well CPUs, and in the L2 caches of Skylake, Kaby Lake, and
Coffee Lake CPUs.
Our hypothesis is that the nondeterminism is due to the per-
sistent control state of the cache replacement policy. Specifi-
cally:
• the control state is not modified after a flush operation
whereas the lines in the cache are invalidated;
• insertion of new blocks in the cache does not fully over-
ride the control state whenever there are invalid lines.
If our hypothesis holds, then the common assumption that
instructions like clflush and wbinvd cleanse all information
from the cache is incorrect. This would also indicate that using
flush operations to prevent access-based attacks is insufficient.
Our approach to validate the aforementioned hypothesis is
the following: (1) First, we fill the cache set with associativity
many known memory blocks I0 . . . In−1; we call the resulting
state s0. (2) Then, we perform additional cache hits to bring
the cache control state into an arbitrary known state si. (3) Fi-
nally, we invalidate the cache contents (by executing wbinvd
or several clflush instructions) and refill the cache with dif-
ferent memory blocks I′0 . . . I
′
n−1; we call the resulting state s
′
i.
If our hypothesis is true, and the control state withstands flush
operations, the control state s′i will depend on the previous
control state si.
1RISC-V cache management still lacks standard flushing mechanisms.
3 Validating the Hypothesis
In this section, we empirically evaluate our hypothesis that
information from the cache’s control state survives the flush
operations on 11 different Intel processors from different
generations.
We start by introducing the tools and setup of our eval-
uation. We continue by discussing two in-depth examples
targeting the L1 PLRU cache from an i7-4790 CPU, and the
L2 Quad-age LRU cache from an i5-6500. We conclude our
evaluation by presenting a summary of all our findings.
3.1 Tools and Setup
In our evaluation, we use two tools to interact with caches:
CacheQuery [49] and the nanoBench Cache Analyzer [1].
Both tools provide a clean interface and low-noise environ-
ment for probing caches, liberating the user from dealing with
intricate details such as the virtual-to-physical memory map-
ping, cache slicing, set indexing, cache filtering, and other
sources of interferences or measurement noise, thus enabling
a “civilized” interaction with an individual cache set.
Namely, users can specify a cache set (say: set 63 in
the L2 cache) and a pattern of memory accesses (say:
“I0 I1 I2 I0 I1 I2”), and they receive as output a sequence (say:
Miss Miss Miss Hit Hit Hit) representing the hits and
misses produced by a sequence of memory loads to addresses
that are mapped into the specified cache set and that follow
the specified pattern.
Example For instance, we can identify the Least Recently
Used (LRU) block of a cache containing blocks “I0 . . . I7”
as follows: we cause an eviction by accessing “I8” (a block
not in the cache) and then check whether accessing block
“I j”, where 0≤ j ≤ 7, produces a hit or a miss. Note that one
would need to reset the cache state each time and access “I8 I j”
for all 0≤ j ≤ 7 to determine which block has been evicted.
If accessing “I8 I1” causes a cache miss for “I1”, this shows
that “I1” has been evicted by “I8” and thus must have been
the LRU block prior to the access to I8.
3.2 Example 1: L1’s Tree-based PLRU
As confirmed by prior research [1, 49], many Intel CPUs im-
plement a tree-based Pseudo-LRU replacement policy in their
L1 caches.
Replacement Policy Tree-based PLRU is a well known
approximation of the LRU policy. It consists of a binary tree
where each cache line is a leaf, and each internal node has a
bit of control, where 0 represents an arrow pointing to the left
child and 1 an arrow pointing to the right child. See Figure 1
for an example of a PLRU tree.
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Figure 1: Cache state s1 of an 8-way PLRU cache set after
filling an empty (invalidated) cache with blocks I0 . . . I7 and
accessing a synchronizing sequence “I0 I2 I4 I6”. Arrows point
to the LRU block, in this case I1. On an empty cache, new
block are inserted from left to right.
Upon a cache hit, all the ancestors of the accessed cache
line update their arrows to point towards the opposite direc-
tion of the leaf. Upon a cache miss, the block to replace is
identified by following the arrows from the root node. When
a new block is inserted, the arrows are updated as in the hit
operation.
As a tree with n leafs has n−1 internal nodes, correspond-
ing to the PLRU bits in our example, the total number of
control states for PLRU is 2n−1, where n is the associativity
or ways of the cache. Thus, for an 8-way PLRU cache we
have 128 different control states.
Experiment We now proceed to test our hypothesis, as de-
scribed in Section 2, for the L1 cache of an i7-4790 processor.
First, we fill the cache with blocks I0 . . . I7, which on an
empty cache are inserted from left to right, and we bring
the cache’s control state to any desired state, for example, to
state s2 by further accessing the sequence “I0 I2 I4 I6 I4 I0”
(see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Cache state s2 of PLRU cache after marking I7 as
the LRU block, by accessing sequence “I0 I2 I4 I6 I4 I0”.
Then, we continue by invalidating the cache with a wbvind
instruction, and refilling the cache with associativity many
new memory blocks I8 . . . I15, which again are inserted from
left to right.
At this point, we validate our hypothesis by comparing the
resulting control state s′2 (see Figure 3) with s2 (see Figure 2).
For that, we rely on CacheQuery to probe the cache
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Figure 3: Resulting cache state s′2 after invalidating state s2
and refilling the cache with new blocks I8 . . . I15. On an
empty cache blocks are inserted from left to right.
state and we verify that the eviction order of s′2’s blocks is
“I15 I11 I13 I9 I14 I10 I12 I8”, which uniquely corresponds to a
control state identical to that of s2.
After repeating the experiment for all possible states, we
conclude that our hypothesis holds and that the control state
survives both flushing and the insertion of new blocks.
Note that we observe the same effect when replacing
the wbinvd instruction with a sequence of clflush in-
structions for each block I0 . . . I7, or when writing 1 to
IA32_FLUSH_CMD MSR.
3.3 Example 2: L2’s Quad-age LRU
Modern Intel CPUs have an L2 cache of associativity 4 with
an undocumented replacement policy that has only recently
been reverse engineered [1, 49].
Replacement Policy This policy is an instance of
Quad-Age LRU [23], called New1 in [49] and QLRU_H00_-
M1_R2_U1 in [1]. The policy keeps two bits of control state
(or metadata) per line, which can be interpreted as associating
one of four possible ages with each line (0 to 3), hence the
name. See Figure 4a for an example.
Upon a cache hit, the age of the accessed block is set to 0.
Upon a cache miss, the first line, starting from the left, with
age 3 is replaced, and the new block is inserted in this line
with an initial age of 1. Observe that empty (or invalidated)
lines are filled from right to left, before considering blocks
with age 3. After each memory access, the ages of the lines
are normalized to ensure the presence of an age-3 cache line:
As long as there is no age-3 cache line, the ages of cache lines,
except for the updated (or inserted) one, are incremented by 1.
Interestingly, after normalization any valid state has: (1)
at least one age-3 cache line; and (2) after a hit or miss, at
least one cache line with age 0 or 1. Thus, for a 4-way cache,
we can count the total number of valid states—on a filled
cache set—as 44−34−24 +1 = 160, where: 44 is the size of
the complete state space, 34 is the number of states without
any age-3 line , 24 is the number of states without ages 1
and 0, and finally there is 1 control state, {2,2,2,2}, that we
subtracted twice.
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(a) Cache state s1 on a 4-ways New1 cache set after filling an empty
(or invalidated) cache with blocks I3 . . . I0 and further accessing
sequence “I0 I1 I2 I0 I1”.
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(b) Resulting cache state s′1 after invalidating state s1 and refilling
the cache with new blocks I7 . . . I4. On an empty cache blocks are
inserted from right to left.
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(c) Cache state s2 on a 4-ways New1 cache set after filling an empty
(or invalidated) cache with blocks I3 . . . I0 and further accessing
sequence “I0 I1 I2 I0 I1 I3 I1”.
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2
(d) Resulting cache state s′2 after invalidating state s2 and refilling
the cache with new blocks I7 . . . I4. On an empty cache blocks are
inserted from right to left.
Figure 4: List of cache states for the experiment on L2’s
Quad-age LRU variants.
Experiment To validate our hypothesis that the control
state survives cache-flushing operations, we perform an ex-
periment, similar to the one described in Section 3.2, for the
L2 cache of a Core i5-6500 processor.
First, we fill the cache with blocks I3 . . . I0, which on an
empty cache are inserted from right to left, and bring the
cache’s control state to a specific state, for example, to s1 by
further accessing the sequence “I0 I1 I2 I0 I1” (see Figure 4a).
Then, we continue by invalidating the cache with a wbinvd
instruction, and by refilling the cache with associativity many
new memory blocks I7 . . . I4, which again are inserted from
right to left.
Unfortunately, in this case, comparing s′1 (see Figure 4b)
and s1 (see Figure 4a) is not enough for validating our hypoth-
esis, because the insertion of new blocks modifies the control
state. We later provide a precise description of this behavior.
Instead, we verify that two different initial control states
s1 and s2 (see Figure 4c) result in two different control states
s′1 and s
′
2 (see Figure 4d), causing different eviction orders.
Namely, we use CacheQuery to test that s′1 first evicts I1 and
s′2 first evicts I2.
After repeating the experiment for all possible states, we
conclude that our hypothesis holds and that the control state
partially survives the flushing and the insertion of new blocks.
Note that we observe the same effect2 when replacing the
wbinvd instruction with a sequence of clflush instructions
for each block I0 . . . I3.
Reverse Engineering the Insertion Logic In order to re-
verse engineer the insertion logic when invalid blocks are
present, we obtain all the resulting control states, after inval-
idating and refilling the cache, from the 160 possible initial
control states.
For this, we set the cache set into a given control state,
invalidate the cache set, insert associativity many new blocks,
and probe the cache until we uniquely identify its resulting
control state. Note that since the probing is destructive, we
often require to redo all these steps.
The probing works as follows: (1) Start with the complete
set of states; (2) Perform a random memory access and elimi-
nate all the states that are inconsistent with the observation
(i.e., hit or miss) according to the replacement policy; (3) Re-
peat step 2 until we are left with a single possible state.
Once we obtained the mapping from the 160 pre-flush
control states to the post-refill control states, we manually
inferred the following rules that are fully consistent with the
mapping:
• Invalidation does not reset the cache control state;
• A new block’s age is set to 1 if its cache line’s age was
previously greater than 0, and kept to 0 otherwise;
• Normalization occurs as described earlier, and does not
discriminate between valid and invalid lines.
Interestingly, with the simple refilling we use (i.e.,
“I7 . . . I4”), the set of leaked states is reduced to a subset
of only 11 different control states. We do not explore whether
more complicated insertions—with interleaved hits—can in-
crease the size of this subset, and, therefore, increase the
leakage.
3.4 Experimental Results
In this section we test how the wbinvd and clflush opera-
tions affect the cache’s control state in all the cache levels of
11 different Intel processors from different generations. For
each of the processors and cache levels, we performed tests
similar to those explained in Sections 3.2–3.3.
2Invalidation with IA32_FLUSH_CMD is available only for L1 caches.
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We quantify how much information survives the flush oper-
ation. For this, let the random variable S be a uniform distribu-
tion of initial control states, and the random variable O be the
control states after a flush operation. The mutual information
I(S;O) = H(S)−H(S|O) captures how many bits are leaked.
For L1’s PLRU, H(S) = log2 128 = 7 and H(S|O) = 0,
given that we are able to uniquely identify all the initial states.
Hence we find that the leakage is 7 bits.
For L2’s New1 (QLRU_H00_M1_R2_U1), H(S) =
log2 160 = 7.32 and H(S|O) requires more fine grained in-
formation about the joint probability distribution, which we
are able to obtain from the 160 transitions. We find that the
leakage is 3.17 bits.
Observe also that if there is only one observation (i.e.,
the resulting state after a flush is always the same) for any
initial state, then H(S|O) = H(S) and therefore the mutual
information I(S;O) is 0, i.e., there is no leakage.
CPU Cache level Assoc. Leakage (bits)
Core i5-750
(Nehalem)
L1 8 0
L2 8 0
L3 16 0
Core i5-650
(Westmere)
L1 8 0
L2 8 0
L3 16 0
Core i7-2600
(Sandy Bridge)
L1 8 7
L2 8 0
L3 16 0
Core i5-3470
(Ivy Bridge)
L1 8 7
L2 8 0
L3 12 0
Core i7-4790
(Haswell)
L1 8 7
L2 8 0
L3 16 0
Core i5-5200U
(Broadwell)
L1 8 7
L2 8 0
L3 12 0
Core i5-6500
(Skylake)
L1 8 0
L2 4 3.17
L3 12 0
Core i7-8550U
(Kaby Lake)
L1 8 0
L2 4 3.17
L3 16 0
Core i7-8700K
(Coffee Lake)
L1 8 0
L2 4 3.17
L3 16 0
Core i3-8121U)
(Cannon Lake)
L1 8 0
L2 4 0
L3 16 0
Core i5-1035G1)
(Ice Lake)
L1 12 0
L2 8 0
L3 12 0
Table 1: List of evaluated processors and cache levels. The
leakage in bits correspond to the mutual information I(S;O).
Table 1 reports all our findings, which we summarize here:
• For pre-Skylake processors (except for Nehalem and
Westmere), the control state of L1 caches persists even af-
ter flushing operations (wbinvd, sequences of clflush, and
writing 1 to the IA32_FLUSH_CMD MSR).
• For processors between Skylake and Coffee Lake, the
control state of L2 caches persists even after flushing opera-
tions (through wbinvd and sequences of clflush).
• According to our experiments, it seems that the control
state is wiped out on flushing for the most recent CPU families,
like Cannon Lake and Ice Lake.
4 Discussion
In this section, we briefly discuss possible implications of,
and possible solutions to, Flushgeist.
Access-based Attacks Access-based cache attackers3 mon-
itor their own cache activity to infer activity from a victim,
namely, which cache lines or cache sets the victim accessed.
While this provides a powerful primitive, it only exploits one
dimension: what data is accessed. Knowledge about the con-
trol state provides access to a new dimension: how data is
accessed.
While observing the control state is more difficult, it is
possible for attackers with low-level control of the system [36,
45], and some recent works show that it is also possible in
more common environments [8, 29, 54].
However, these attack were only possible for an adversary
that shared memory, and hence the cache lines and control
state, with the victim. Flushgeist breaks this assumption and
enables an access-based attacker to leak the control state of
the cache in non-shared memory scenarios. This is possible
by flushing and refilling the cache with the attacker’s own
content, before probing the state.
An interesting open question is to quantify how much
Flushgeist augments the attacker’s extraction [10], i.e., the
amount of information that an active attacker can extract from
the cache state.
Cache Partitioning Cache partitioning [27] was initially
proposed to improve predictability by reducing cache con-
tention. Since then, several works [13, 28, 33, 42] have pro-
posed the use of cache partitioning to also mitigate cache
leakage. For instance, mechanisms like Intel’s CAT [24] al-
low partitioning a cache’s ways. In contrast, mechanisms like
page coloring split the cache sets among untrusted parties.
While Intel’s CAT is known to leak through the cache re-
placement policy [29], for page coloring the question remains
open. Thus, we like to point to modern adaptive policies, as
described in [49, 52], as promising candidates for answering
in the positive the question on cross cache set information
leakage.
3We dismiss more powerful trace-based attackers, since general secu-
rity guidelines already recommend to disable hyper-threading for sensitive
computations.
5
Countermeasures Software mitigations would involve re-
placing (or extending) flush instructions on context switches
with accesses to reset sequences—that bring the cache into
a fix control state. Unfortunately, this requires knowledge of
the specific cache content (to cause hits), or an even higher
overhead due to some additional misses.
5 Conclusion
We evaluate the behavior of cache flushing instructions on
several Intel processors and conclude that they do not properly
cleanse all the information stored in the cache. Specifically,
we show that in some caches the control state survives, al-
lowing information leakage beyond cache flushes. We point
out that countermeasures relying solely on flush instructions
should be revised.
Disclosure
We first discussed our observations about the cache control
state surviving flush operations in November 2019.
We reported our findings to Intel’s PSIRT team on the 13th
of April 2020, after having confirmed and understood the
source of leakage.
Intel responded to us on the 19th of May 2020, conclud-
ing that the issue does not pose more risks than traditional
cache side-channels, and thus recommending their best prac-
tice guidelines against side-channel attacks [25].
References
[1] Andreas Abel and Jan Reineke. nanoBench: A low-
overhead tool for running microbenchmarks on x86 sys-
tems. In 2020 IEEE International Symposium on Per-
formance Analysis of Systems and Software (ISPASS),
August 2020. To appear.
[2] Onur Acıiçmez, Billy Bob Brumley, and Philipp Grab-
her. New results on instruction cache attacks. In In-
ternational Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems, pages 110–124. Springer, 2010.
[3] Taha Atahan Akyildiz, Can Berk Guzgeren, Cemal Yil-
maz, and Erkay Savas. MeltdownDetector: A Runtime
Approach for Detecting Meltdown Attacks. Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report 2019/613, 2019.
[4] Mohammad-Mahdi Bazm, Marc Lacoste, Mario Süd-
holt, and Jean-Marc Menaud. Side channels in the
cloud: Isolation challenges, attacks, and countermea-
sures. Url: https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01591808,
March 2017.
[5] Daniel J. Bernstein. Cache-timing attacks on AES,
2004.
[6] Ferdinand Brasser, Urs Müller, Alexandra Dmitrienko,
Kari Kostiainen, Srdjan Capkun, and Ahmad-Reza
Sadeghi. Software grand exposure: SGX cache attacks
are practical. In 11th USENIX Workshop on Offensive
Technologies (WOOT 17). USENIX Association, August
2017.
[7] Benjamin A. Braun, Suman Jana, and Dan Boneh. Ro-
bust and efficient elimination of cache and timing side
channels. CoRR, abs/1506.00189, 2015.
[8] Samira Briongos, Pedro Malagon, Jose M. Moya, and
Thomas Eisenbarth. RELOAD+REFRESH: Abusing
cache replacement policies to perform stealthy cache
attacks. In 29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 20). USENIX Association, August 2020.
[9] Claudio Canella, Daniel Genkin, Lukas Giner, Daniel
Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Marina Minkin, Daniel Moghimi,
Frank Piessens, Michael Schwarz, Berk Sunar,
Jo Van Bulck, and Yuval Yarom. Fallout: Leaking
data on meltdown-resistant CPUs. In Proceedings
of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS). ACM, 2019.
[10] Pablo Cañones, Boris Köpf, and Jan Reineke. Security
analysis of cache replacement policies. In Matteo Maffei
and Mark Ryan, editors, Principles of Security and Trust,
pages 189–209. Springer, 2017.
[11] Xiaowan Dong, Zhuojia Shen, John Criswell, Alan L.
Cox, and Sandhya Dwarkadas. Shielding software from
privileged side-channel attacks. In 27th USENIX Se-
curity Symposium (USENIX Security 18), pages 1441–
1458. USENIX Association, August 2018.
[12] Goran Doychev, Dominik Feld, Boris Köpf, Laurent
Mauborgne, and Jan Reineke. CacheAudit: A tool
for the static analysis of cache side channels. In Pre-
sented as part of the 22nd USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 13), pages 431–446. USENIX Asso-
ciation, 2013.
[13] Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Tom Chothia, and Gernot Heiser.
Time protection: The missing OS abstraction. In Pro-
ceedings of the Fourteenth EuroSys Conference 2019,
EuroSys ’19. ACM, 2019.
[14] Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, and Gernot Heiser. Do hard-
ware cache flushing operations actually meet our expec-
tations? CoRR, abs/1612.04474, 2016.
[15] Daniel Genkin, Lev Pachmanov, Eran Tromer, and Yuval
Yarom. Drive-by key-extraction cache attacks from
portable code. In Applied Cryptography and Network
Security, pages 83–102. Springer, 2018.
6
[16] Michael Godfrey and Mohammad Zulkernine. A server-
side solution to cache-based side-channel attacks in the
cloud. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Sixth Interna-
tional Conference on Cloud Computing, CLOUD ’13,
pages 163–170. IEEE, 2013.
[17] Johannes Götzfried, Moritz Eckert, Sebastian Schinzel,
and Tilo Müller. Cache attacks on Intel SGX. In Pro-
ceedings of the 10th European Workshop on Systems
Security, EuroSec’17. ACM, 2017.
[18] Marc Green, Leandro Rodrigues-Lima, Andreas Zankl,
Gorka Irazoqui, Johann Heyszl, and Thomas Eisenbarth.
AutoLock: Why cache attacks on ARM are harder
than you think. In 26th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 17), pages 1075–1091. USENIX As-
sociation, 2017.
[19] Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Klaus Wagner, and
Stefan Mangard. Flush+flush: A fast and stealthy cache
attack. In Juan Caballero, Urko Zurutuza, and Ricardo J.
Rodríguez, editors, Detection of Intrusions and Malware,
and Vulnerability Assessment, pages 279–299. Springer,
2016.
[20] Daniel Gruss, Raphael Spreitzer, and Stefan Mangard.
Cache template attacks: Automating attacks on inclusive
last-level caches. In 24th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 15), pages 897–912. USENIX Asso-
ciation, 2015.
[21] Ralf Hund, Carsten Willems, and Thorsten Holz. Prac-
tical timing side channel attacks against kernel space
ASLR. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, SP ’13, pages 191–205. IEEE,
2013.
[22] Intel. Deep Dive: Intel Analysis of L1 Terminal Fault.
[23] Intel. Power management of the third generation Intel
Core micro architecture formerly codenamed Ivy Bridge.
Hot Chips, 2012.
[24] Intel. Are noisy neighbors in your data center keeping
you up at night, 2017.
[25] Intel. Guidelines for mitigating timing side channels
against cryptographic implementations, 2019.
[26] Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar.
S$A: A shared cache attack that works across cores and
defies VM sandboxing – and its application to AES. In
Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, SP ’15, pages 591–604. IEEE, 2015.
[27] R. E. Kessler and Mark D. Hill. Page placement al-
gorithms for large real-indexed caches. ACM Trans.
Comput. Syst., 10(4):338–359, November 1992.
[28] Taesoo Kim, Marcus Peinado, and Gloria Mainar-Ruiz.
STEALTHMEM: System-level protection against cache-
based side channel attacks in the cloud. In Presented as
part of the 21st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 12), pages 189–204. USENIX Association,
2012.
[29] Vladimir Kiriansky, Ilia A. Lebedev, Saman P. Ama-
rasinghe, Srinivas Devadas, and Joel S. Emer. DAWG:
A defense against cache timing attacks in speculative
execution processors. In 51st Annual IEEE/ACM In-
ternational Symposium on Microarchitecture, MICRO
2018, Fukuoka, Japan, October 20-24, 2018, pages 974–
987, 2018.
[30] P. Kocher, J. Horn, A. Fogh, D. Genkin, D. Gruss,
W. Haas, M. Hamburg, M. Lipp, S. Mangard, T. Prescher,
M. Schwarz, and Y. Yarom. Spectre attacks: Exploiting
speculative execution. In IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (SP), 2019.
[31] Moritz Lipp, Daniel Gruss, Raphael Spreitzer, Clémen-
tine Maurice, and Stefan Mangard. ARMageddon:
Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices. In 25th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16), pages 549–
564. USENIX Association, 2016.
[32] Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas
Prescher, Werner Haas, Anders Fogh, Jann Horn, Stefan
Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, et al. Meltdown:
Reading kernel memory from user space. In Proceed-
ings of the 27th USENIX Conference on Security Sym-
posium, SEC’18, page 973–990. USENIX Association,
2018.
[33] F. Liu, Q. Ge, Y. Yarom, F. Mckeen, C. Rozas, G. Heiser,
and R. B. Lee. CATalyst: Defeating last-level cache side
channel attacks in cloud computing. In 2016 IEEE In-
ternational Symposium on High Performance Computer
Architecture (HPCA), pages 406–418, 2016.
[34] Fangfei Liu, Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge, Gernot Heiser, and
Ruby B. Lee. Last-level cache side-channel attacks are
practical. In Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, SP ’15, pages 605–622. IEEE,
2015.
[35] Clémentine Maurice, Manuel Weber, Michael Schwarz,
Lukas Giner, Daniel Gruss, Carlo Alberto Boano, Stefan
Mangard, and Kay Römer. Hello from the other side:
SSH over robust cache covert channels in the cloud. In
Proceedings of the 24th Annual Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium, NDSS. The Internet Soci-
ety, February 2017.
[36] Ahmad Moghimi, Gorka Irazoqui, and Thomas Eisen-
barth. CacheZoom: How SGX amplifies the power of
7
cache attacks. In Wieland Fischer and Naofumi Homma,
editors, Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Sys-
tems – CHES 2017, pages 69–90. Springer, 2017.
[37] Yossef Oren, Vasileios P. Kemerlis, Simha Sethumadha-
van, and Angelos D. Keromytis. The spy in the sandbox:
Practical cache attacks in JavaScript and their implica-
tions. In CCS. ACM, 2015.
[38] Dag Arne Osvik, Adi Shamir, and Eran Tromer. Cache
attacks and countermeasures: The case of AES. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers’ Track at the
RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology, CT-RSA’06,
pages 1–20. Springer-Verlag, 2006.
[39] Maria Méndez Real. Spatial Isolation against Logical
Cache-based Side-Channel Attacks in Many-Core Ar-
chitectures. PhD thesis, University of Southern Brittany,
Morbihan, France, 2017.
[40] Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Moghimi,
Jo Van Bulck, Julian Stecklina, Thomas Prescher, and
Daniel Gruss. ZombieLoad: Cross-privilege-boundary
data sampling. In CCS, 2019.
[41] Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clé-
mentine Maurice, and Stefan Mangard. Malware guard
extension: Using SGX to conceal cache attacks. In
Michalis Polychronakis and Michael Meier, editors, De-
tection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability
Assessment, pages 3–24. Springer, 2017.
[42] J. Shi, X. Song, H. Chen, and B. Zang. Limiting cache-
based side-channel in multi-tenant cloud using dynamic
page coloring. In 2011 IEEE/IFIP 41st International
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks Work-
shops (DSN-W), pages 194–199, 2011.
[43] Eran Tromer, Dag Arne Osvik, and Adi Shamir. Efficient
cache attacks on AES, and countermeasures. J. Cryptol.,
23(1):37–71, January 2010.
[44] Jo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel
Genkin, Baris Kasikci, Frank Piessens, Mark Silberstein,
Thomas F. Wenisch, Yuval Yarom, and Raoul Strackx.
Foreshadow: Extracting the keys to the Intel SGX king-
dom with transient out-of-order execution. In Proceed-
ings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX
Association, August 2018.
[45] Jo Van Bulck, Frank Piessens, and Raoul Strackx. SGX-
Step: A practical attack framework for precise enclave
execution control. In Proceedings of the 2Nd Workshop
on System Software for Trusted Execution, SysTEX’17,
pages 4:1–4:6. ACM, 2017.
[46] Stephan van Schaik, Alyssa Milburn, Sebastian Öster-
lund, Pietro Frigo, Giorgi Maisuradze, Kaveh Razavi,
Herbert Bos, and Cristiano Giuffrida. RIDL: Rogue
in-flight data load. In S&P, May 2019.
[47] Stephan van Schaik, Marina Minkin, Andrew Kwong,
Daniel Genkin, and Yuval Yarom. CacheOut: Leak-
ing data on Intel CPUs via cache evictions. https:
//cacheoutattack.com/, 2020.
[48] Venkatanathan Varadarajan, Thomas Ristenpart, and
Michael Swift. Scheduler-based defenses against cross-
VM side-channels. In 23rd USENIX Security Sympo-
sium (USENIX Security 14), pages 687–702, 2014.
[49] Pepe Vila, Pierre Ganty, Marco Guarnieri, and Boris
Köepf. CacheQuery: Learning Replacement Policies
from Hardware Caches. In Proceedings of the 41st ACM
SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language De-
sign and Implementation, pages 519–532. ACM, 2020.
[50] Pepe Vila, Boris Köpf, and Jose Morales. Theory and
Practice of Finding Eviction Sets. In 40th IEEE Sym-
posium on Security and Privacy (S& P ’19), pages 695–
710. IEEE, 2019.
[51] Nils Wistoff, Moritz Schneider, Frank K. Gürkaynak,
Luca Benini, and Gernot Heiser. Prevention of microar-
chitectural covert channels on an open-source 64-bit
RISC-V core, 2020.
[52] Henry Wong. Intel Ivy Bridge Cache Replacement Pol-
icy. Url: http://blog.stuffedcow.net/2013/01/
ivb-cache-replacement/, January 2013.
[53] Wm. A. Wulf and Sally A. McKee. Hitting the memory
wall: Implications of the obvious. SIGARCH Comput.
Archit. News, 23(1):20–24, March 1995.
[54] Wenjie Xiong and Jakub Szefer. Leaking information
through cache LRU states. CoRR, abs/1905.08348,
2019.
[55] Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner. FLUSH+RELOAD:
A high resolution, low noise, L3 cache side-channel at-
tack. In 23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Se-
curity 14), pages 719–732. USENIX Association, 2014.
[56] F. Zaruba and L. Benini. The cost of application-class
processing: Energy and performance analysis of a Linux-
ready 1.7-GHz 64-bit RISC-V core in 22-nm FDSOI
technology. IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale In-
tegration (VLSI) Systems, 27(11):2629–2640, November
2019.
[57] Ning Zhang, Kun Sun, Deborah Shands, Wenjing Lou,
and Y. Thomas Hou. TruSpy: Cache side-channel infor-
mation leakage from the secure world on ARM devices.
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/980, 2016.
8
[58] Yinqian Zhang and Michael K. Reiter. Düppel:
Retrofitting commodity operating systems to mitigate
cache side channels in the cloud. In Proceedings of the
2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Com-
munications Security, CCS ’13, pages 827–838. ACM,
2013.
9
